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NOTES

Nov., 19551

TORTS: STATE LIABILITY FOR TORTS OF CONVICTS UNDER STATE TORT CLAIMS
ACT. It is a well-settled common law rule that in the absence of statutory or constitutional provision, a state cannot be sued in tort.' This note deals with an interesting
case requiring interpretation of a statutory exception to the common law rule.

In 1951, the North Carolina legislature enacted the State Tort Claims Act.2 This
act empowered the State Industrial Commission to grant awards up to $8,000 for
injuries to innocent third parties caused by the negligence of employees of any3
department, institution, or agency of the state within the scope of their employment.
The enactment of this act showed a legislative intent to apply some limitations to
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a principle which has defeated hapless claimants
with monotonous regularity.
In Alliance Co. v. State Hospital at Butner,4 the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed a judgment for the plaintiff in the Superior Court, holding that the
State Tort Claims Act was not intended to relieve claimants who were injured by

the negligence of a prisoner acting within the scope of his authority in carrying out

state activities under the orders of prison officials. An inmate of the Umstead Youth
Center, an agency of the State of North Carolina, 5 while operating a state-owned
vehicle in the performance of duties assigned to him by his superiors, was involved
in an accident causing damage to the claimant. There was no dispute in the facts
that the inmate was negligent and that there was no contributory negligence on the
part of the claimant.
The only question resolved in the case was whether or not the inmate was a state

employee within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. The problem
of who would be an employee under the act was recognized in an article 6 discussing
the act, which stated:
"A number of problems ... will inevitably arise in the administration of the new
law and will be resolved by judicial interpretation: . . . (2) Who is included in the
meaning of the term employee?"7 (Emphasis added.)

In rendering their decision, the Supreme Court discussed statutory interpretation,
but relied heavily on the definition of the term employee in Webster's New International Dictionary, where an employee was defined as "one who works for wages

or salary in the service of an employer." The court also cited other cases9 in support
of their interpretation of the word "employee," and from these cases concluded that
the relation of employer and employee is essentially contractual, and is to be determined by the rules governing the establishment of contracts. The cases cited, however,
were proceedings under a workmen's compensation act, the facts of which were not
analogous to the facts in the case under consideration. Workmen's compensation acts
deal with liability to an employee. The act which is the subject of the litigation in
the present case deals with liability to third parties. It would seem then, that in this
case there is need for a more exhaustive definition of the term "employee." It is
1 81 C.J.S. States 1137 § 130 (1953).
'N.S. SESs. LAws 1951 c. 1059.

'The act provides:

".

resulting from a negligent act of a State employee..

.." (Emphasis

added.)
'241 N.C. 329, 85 S.E.2d 386 (1955).
Authorized by N. C. Szss. LAws 1949 c. 297.
'Note, 29 N.C.L. Rav. 416 (1951).
7 Id. at 420.
' See note 4 supraat 331, 85 S.E.2d at 389.
'Borders v. Cline, 212 N.C. 472, 193 S.E. 826 (1937) ; Hollowell v. North Carolina Department
of Conservation and Development, 206 N.C. 206, 173 S.E. 603 (1934).
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obvious that one employed is an employee. One authority in the field presents a
convenient question and answer to the problem of the meaning of the term
"employed":
"Does 'employed' imply that there must be a hiring? It would seem so, but the
Restatement ... states the well established rule that no compensation is necessary. Nor
' 10
(Emphasis added.)
need there be a contract.

The Restatement has recognized this principle elsewhere, stating that a servant is:
"(1) A person employed to perform service for another in his affairs and who, with
respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the service, is subject to the other's
control or right to control."

1

(Emphasis added.)

Taking the term "employed" as interpreted by Mechem and the Restatement, how
does this apply to a prisoner? A recent article, 1 2 in discussing denial of prisoners'
claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 13 describes the status of a prisoner as
follows:
"Prison discipline means, conventionally, the regulation or attempt at regulation
is permitted
of all the details of the life of the prisoner by means of rules. The1 prisoner
4
to do nothing except under the direction of officers of the prison."

Therefore, it would seem that a better analysis of the word "employed" might
not make it imperative to include the terms "wages," "contractual," or "hire." How,
then, could this reasoning be applied so as to include prisoners within the meaning
of the term "employee" under the State Tort Claims Act? Conceding strict interpretation of statutes waiving sovereign immunity, 15 could it be applied on public policy?
Indeed, it has been done. 1 6 In Washington v. State,l 7 where a convict was allowed
recovery against the State of New York when injured by the negligence of a fellow
inmate, the court said:
"However, when the State undertakes to perform one of its functions through the
medium of such inmates and directs them, as it did here, to perform certain duties, under
immediate supervision of a State employee, then the State makes such inmates its agents
and employees while in the performance of such duties, at least to the extent of rendering
the State liable for their tortious acts in the performance of such duties."18 (Emphasis

added.)
And in Robinson v. State,' 9 in an action by a convict for the state's negligence
in failing to provide a reasonably safe place to work, the court said:
"... though employed while confined in a penal institution of the State, the claimant
stands on the same footing as any other employee .... ,20 (Emphasis added.)

The reasoning in the Washington and Robinson cases is in accord with the dissent
in the case under consideration. In holding that the state should be liable for torts
of its prisoners while performing duties authorized by the state, the dissenting judge
10 MECHAM, AGENCY § 280 (4th ed. 1952).
" RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 220 (1933).
Note, 63 YALE L.J. 418 (1954).
1128 U.S.C. § 1346, 2671-80 (1948).
1"
14

See note 12, supra at 425 n. 53.

Floyd v. North Carolina State Highway and Public Works Commission, 241 N.C. 461,
85 S.E.2d 703 (1955) ; Van Zuch v. U. S., 118 F.Supp. 468 (1954) ; Shew v. U. S., 116 F.Supp. 1
(1953) ; Sigmon v. U. S., 110 F.Supp. 906 (1953).
16 Washington v. State, 277 App.Div. 1079, 100 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1950); Sullivan v. State, 257
App.Div. 893, 12 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1939); Wilson v. State Highway Commissioners, 174 Va. 82,
45 S.E.2d 746 (1939).
" 277 App.Div. 1079, 100 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1950).
'sId. at 1081, 100 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
"°242 App.Div. 94, 273 N.Y.S. 465 (1934).
20 Id.
at 98, 273 N.Y.S. at 468.

